

Message Text

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15

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 SAM-01 NRC-05 ERDA-05

NSCE-00 /096 W

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R 180745Z JUN 75

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3917

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USMISSION USUN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L PEKING 1137

NOFORN

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH AS

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE PRC

SUMMARY: SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA AND CHINA'S ROLES IN THE
REGION DOMINATED THE SEVERAL HOURS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL TALKS
BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WILLESEE AND PRC FOREIGN
MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA IN THE COURSE OF WILLESEE'S JUNE 6-10
1975, VISIT TO PEKING. AUSTRALIAN EMBOFFS TOLD US THEY WERE
PLEASED WITH CHIAO'S PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE REGION.

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THEY WERE PARTICULARLY HAPPY THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED AUSTRALIA'S INTERES

T IN

ASIA AS A MEMBER OF THE ASIAN/PACIFIC REGION AND WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES IN DETAIL WITH THEM. CHINESE CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET MOVES TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS CONTRASTING BENIGN VIEW OF A CONTINUED US ROLE IN THE AREA WERE MAJOR THEMES THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATIONS. CHIAO AGAIN REFERRED TO A POSITIVE US ROLE IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA, EXPRESSED CHINESE UNDERSTANDING OF US POLICY ON DIEGO GARCIA, AND REITERATED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR CLOSE TIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. HE ALSO SOUGHT TO REASSURE AUSTRALIANS THAT NORTH KOREANS WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING MILITARY ACTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. END SUMMARY.

1. AUSTRALIA'S ROLE IN ASIA. ACCORDING TO AUSTRALIAN EMBOFFS, WILLESEE MADE A CONSCIOUS ATTEMPT TO FOCUS TALKS WITH CHINESE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WAS PLEASED WHEN CHIAO RECOGNIZED AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND BEGAN TALKING ABOUT THE ASIAN/PACIFIC REGION. THE CHINESE HAD NOT BEFORE LET THE AUSTRALIANS TALK WITH ANYONE INVOLVED WITH ASIAN AFFAIRS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY--AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ARE LUMPED BUREAUCRATICALLY WITH NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA--AND AUSTRALIANS NOW HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE CHINESE ON MATTERS MORE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE WILLESEE CALL ON MARCOS IN PEKING ALSO BUTRESSED AUSTRALIA'S ASIAN CREDENTIALS, AND CHIAO'S COMMENT THAT AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE CLOSEST OF ALL "SECOND WORLD" COUNTRIES TO "THIRD WORLD" POSITIONS SYMBOLIZED THE--UNEXPECTED--CLOSENESS OF VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES ON NUMEROUS ISSUES.

2. SOVIET AND US ROLES. CHIAO EXPRESSED CHINESE CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ATTEMPT TO EXPAND THEIR ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCED US POSITION THERE AND STATED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR CONTINUING US INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN THE REGION. AFTER REPEATED WARNINGS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS TO CONVINCE THEIR GUESTS OF THE NEED FOR CAREFUL VIGILANCE, HOWEVER, CHIAO CONCLUDED WITH THE USUAL CONFIDENT STATEMENT THAT SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD NOT SUCCEED. HE REPEATED EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM INDOCHINA HAD CONFIDENTIAL

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ELIMINATED A MAJOR BURDEN FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NOW IT COULD CONCENTRATE ON ITS PRIMARY SECURITY INTEREST OF CHECKING SOVIET MOVES. THIS WOULD BE A POSITIVE THING BOTH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE ASIAN REGION AS A WHOLE. CHIAO'S CAUTIONING THE AUSTRALIANS ON CRITICISM OF OUR DIEGO GARCIA PLANS (PEKING 1107) WAS IN THIS CONTEXT.

3. ASEAN AND INDOCHINA, AUSTRALIANS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT

A SPLIT WOULD NOT DEVELOP BETWEEN INDOCHINA COUNTRIES AND ASEAN COUNTRIES AND CHIAO READILY AGREED. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE INDOCHINA COUNTRIES AND SAID THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF WIDER REGIONAL ORGANIZATION COULD COME ABOUT ONLY AFTER GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. IN RESPONSE TO AN AUSTRALIAN COMMENT ON PRC STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN INSURGENT GROUPS, CHIAO SAID THESE STATEMENTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THESE COUNTRIES AND CHINA WOULD CONTINUE THE PRACTICE.

HE REPEATED THE STANDARD PRC LINE THAT REVOLUTION COULD NOT BE EXPORTED AND CITED EARLIER DIRECT CHINESE AID FOR MALAYSIAN INSURGENTS AS AN EXAMPLE OF USELESSNESS OF OUTSIDE AID IF CONDITIONS WERE NOT RIPE FOR REVOLUTION IN A COUNTRY. WHEN THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO VIETNAM, CHIAO IMPLIED THAT THE SOUTH HAD AN EQUAL RIGHT WITH THE NORTH TO DECIDE ON THE ISSUE OF REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM BUT HE CLEARLY EXPECTED REUNIFICATION TO COME ABOUT AT SOME POINT.

4. JAPAN. CHIAO RAISED THE QUESTION OF US TROOPS IN JAPAN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FIRST THAT JAPAN HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THEN WITH CHINA, ADDING THAT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE RESPECTED BY CHINA. HE REMARKED PHILOSOPHICALLY THAT STATIONING TROOPS IN ANOTHER COUNTRY INEVITABLY LED TO A DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED AND THAT JAPAN WOULD BE A BETTER FRIEND OF THE US AFTER US TROOPS WERE NO LONGER STATIONED ON JAPANESE SOIL. CHIAO INDICATED HE WAS TALKING IN LONG-TERM RATHER THAN NEAR FUTURE AND HE DID NOT OFFER ANY SUGGESTION AS TO WHAT WOULD REPLACE THE SECURITY ROLE SERVED BY US TROOPS STATIONED THERE.

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5. KOREA. CHIAO DERIDED PRESS SPECULATION THAT NORTH KOREA MIGHT BE PLANNING AN IMMINENT MILITARY ACTION IN KOREA AS "SILLY" AND NOT WORTH SERIOUS DISCUSSION. HE SAID THE TIMING OF KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO THE PRC WAS COINCIDENTAL AND HAD BEEN ARRANGED BEFORE INDOCHINA FELL. CHINESE WERE CERTAIN THAT NORTH KOREA WOULD NOT LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST THE SOUTH AND THEY FELT CONFIDENT THE SOUTH WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT US BACKING. THE US ROLE ON THE PENINSULA WAS LIKELY TO BE CAUTIOUS, IN HIS VIEW, SO THERE WAS NO REAL CONCERN THAT WAR WOULD BREAK OUT IN KOREA. IN GENERAL, CHIAO SEEMED SMUG ABOUT SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE KIM VISIT, NOTING THAT CHINESE WERE CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT "WIELD A BATON" THERE.

6. NUCLEAR TESTING. SPURRED BY WILLESEE'S PRESENTATION OF THE

AUSTRALIAN POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTING, CHIAO LAUNCHED INTO A LONG EXPOSITION OF THE RATIONAL BEHIND THE PRC TESTING PROGRAM. HE MADE IT CLEAR CHINA WOULD CONTINUE TESTING ABOVE GROUND AND THAT PROTESTS BY AUSTRALIANS AND OTHERS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT BUT THAT CHINA WOULD UNDERSTAND REASONS BEHIND THE PROTESTS.

7. CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND WANG HAI-JUNG. AS AN INTERESTING WRINKLE IN INTERNAL PRC POLITICS, AUSTRALIANS DETECTED A NOTICEABLE TIGHTENING OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT AND A SOMEWHAT LESS PRAGMATIC PRESENTATION IN CHIAO'S REMARKS ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE TALKS WHEN HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG, THE PUTATIVE NIECE OF MAO TSE-TUNG WHO PLAYS A ROLE IN SINO-US RELATIONS AND MAY WELL ACT AS CHUNGNANHAI'S WATCHDOG IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. CHIAO SEEMED TO FEEL THE NEED IN THE PRESENCE OF WANG, TO USE SEVERAL MAO QUOTES TO BUTTRESS HIS POSITIONS. WHEN HE TWISTED THE SCRIPTURE AT ONE POINT, MS. WANG BROKE IN WITH A "WHAT THE MINISTER MEANT TO SAY WAS..." THAT BROUGHT A PAINED LOOK FROM CHIAO. THE TRANSLATER DELICATELY OMMITTED THE "MEANT TO SAY" OPENING PHRASE AND TRANSLATED ONLY WANG'S MAO QUOTE. CHIAO THEN CONTINUED HIS POINT WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THE INTERVENTION. BUSH

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MINISTERIAL VISITS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975PEKING01137
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750212-0018
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750638/aaaabips.tel
Line Count: 187
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <28 OCT 2003 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE PRC SUMMARY: SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA AND CHINA'S ROLES IN THE
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, AS, CH, (WILLESEE, DONALD R), (CHIAO KUAN-HUA)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006